GPU VulnDB

Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

Connaisseur: Cosign signature threshold counts signatures, not distinct trust roots

CVSS 6.3CVE-2026-102884Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

Connaisseur is meant to enforce that an image is signed by several independent trust roots before the cluster admits it. With a trustRoot "*" policy that uses an explicit threshold or the implicit require-all rule, versions before 3.11.1 count valid signature layers, not distinct roots. Someone holding the signing key of just one configured root can attach several signatures to an image and meet a quorum meant to need several signers. On a GPU cluster that relies on multi-party signing to keep unvetted images off shared nodes, that one compromised key is enough to get an image admitted. Policies with a single trust root or the required option are not affected.

Who can reach it

An attacker who controls the signing key of one configured trust root and can push signatures for an image to the registry. They then need the image deployed, which takes at least low-privileged access to create workloads. Network-reachable, high attack complexity.

What to do

Upgrade Connaisseur to 3.11.1. That is a rolling update of the admission controller deployment and needs no node drain. Until then, review any policy that uses trustRoot "*" with a threshold or require-all, and switch to the required option that lists the roots explicitly. After upgrading, consider re-checking images admitted under the affected policies.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.