GPU VulnDB

Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps

SeaweedFS Helm chart: embedded SFTP host key lets anyone impersonate the storage endpoint

CVSS 7.0CVE-2026-100413Control plane, storage & DevOpscurated

Impact

From 4.0.388 until 4.41 the SeaweedFS SFTP Helm chart shipped one unencrypted Ed25519 private host key in sftp-secret.yaml, so every standalone deployment that took the legacy sftp.sshPrivateKey path presented the same publicly known host identity. An attacker able to intercept or redirect client traffic can stand up a rogue SFTP endpoint that clients accept, harvesting passwords and the data being uploaded. On a GPU fleet this is the object/file store that training jobs and dataset staging pull from, so the credentials and payloads at risk are the ones that feed the cluster. The record notes the key only loads when sftp.enabled and sftp.enableAuth are set, no sftp.existingConfigSecret is supplied, and hostKeysFolder provides no later Ed25519 signer; default all-in-one and non-authenticated standalone paths did not load it.

Who can reach it

Anyone positioned to intercept or redirect SFTP client traffic on the network path to the SeaweedFS SFTP endpoint. No authentication needed; clients must have trusted the published host key, and the deployment must match the configuration above.

What to do

Upgrade to SeaweedFS 4.41 and - because the old key is public - generate a fresh host key, supply it through sftp.existingConfigSecret or hostKeysFolder, and redistribute the new host fingerprint to clients. Rotate any password credentials that clients may have sent to the affected endpoint. Restarting the SFTP pods is enough; no node work.

References

Related entries

All Control plane, storage & DevOps entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.