GPU VulnDB

Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

Gardener provider extensions: code injection via Terraformer lets a project admin take over the seed cluster

CVSS 9.9CVE-2025-59823Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

A user who only holds administrative rights inside a single Gardener project can inject code into the Terraformer run that provisions that shoot's infrastructure, and from there gain control of the seed cluster that manages it. The seed hosts the control planes of every shoot assigned to it, so this is a tenant-to-operator escape: one project owner reaches the credentials, kubeconfigs and control-plane workloads of unrelated clusters on the same seed. For a GPU cloud that hands each customer their own Gardener project, that is the full multi-tenancy boundary. The flaw spans the AWS, Azure, GCP and OpenStack provider extensions and applies to any installation where Terraformer is used or can be enabled.

Who can reach it

Authenticated, with administrative privileges on a Gardener project (a normal tenant role in a managed-Kubernetes offering). No access to the seed cluster or to the management network is needed.

What to do

Upgrade the affected provider extensions: AWS to 1.64.0, Azure to 1.55.0, GCP to 1.46.0, OpenStack to 1.49.0. This is a controller image bump in the garden/seed cluster - the extension pods restart and reconcile; no worker node drain or reboot is involved. Where an upgrade cannot be scheduled immediately, review whether Terraformer-based provisioning can be disabled for the affected providers and audit project-admin grants.

References

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This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.