GPU VulnDB

Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

Argo Workflows (Argo Server, archived workflow retrieval under client/sso auth mode): With --auth-mode=client the

CVE-2024-53862Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationGHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9curated

Impact

With --auth-mode=client the archived-workflow GET endpoint accepts a forged token, and with --auth-mode=sso any valid token reads any archived workflow regardless of namespace. An attacker or a low-privilege tenant reads other tenants' completed run history - parameters, artifact locations, and whatever those specs embed.

Who can reach it

Anyone who can reach the Argo Server API. In client mode a fabricated token is enough; in SSO mode any legitimate account, including the lowest-privilege one, reads everything.

What to do

Upgrade Argo Server to 3.5.13 or 3.6.2 and restart. Prefer --auth-mode=server or sso with the fix in place over client mode, and treat archived workflow contents as having been readable by every authenticated user before the upgrade.

References

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.