Database/Control plane, storage & DevOps
AMD Optimizing CPU Libraries (AOCL) - DLL hijacking: A DLL search-order hijack in AOCL lets an attacker get
Impact
A DLL search-order hijack in AOCL lets an attacker get their library loaded by a privileged process, reaching arbitrary code execution. Same practical exposure as the AOCL permissions issue: the CPU math libraries underneath your AMD-node ML stack become a privilege-escalation vector.
Who can reach it
Local, requires the ability to place a library where the search order will find it first. Windows-oriented, though the search-path pattern has Linux analogues via LD_LIBRARY_PATH on badly configured hosts.
What to do
Update AOCL. Check that no shared-node job can influence library search paths for privileged processes - on Linux that means auditing LD_LIBRARY_PATH handling in your job launcher and any setuid tooling. Package update, no reboot, no firmware.
References
This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.