Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

Envoy: use-after-free in the QUIC server stream when QUICHE pushes headers after StopReading()

CVSS 7.5CVE-2024-32974Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

Envoy fronts inference endpoints and sits in the data path of every service mesh built on Istio or Contour, including the ingress in front of model-serving pods. QUICHE can continue to deliver request headers after StopReading() has been called on the stream, by which point the connection manager's ActiveStream may already be freed, so an up-call lands on freed memory and the proxy crashes. The record scores this as availability-only: an unauthenticated client who can reach the QUIC listener can drop the proxy and with it every route behind it. Only deployments with HTTP/3 (QUIC) listeners enabled are exposed.

Who can reach it

Any unauthenticated client that can open a QUIC/HTTP3 connection to an Envoy listener - the internet for an ingress gateway, any pod in the mesh for a sidecar.

What to do

Upgrade Envoy to a release carrying the fix from GHSA-mgxp-7hhp-8299 and restart the proxies; for sidecars this is a mesh-wide data-plane roll, for gateways a rolling restart of the gateway deployment. As an interim measure, disabling QUIC/HTTP3 listeners removes the exposed code path. No node reboot and no GPU drain.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32974 https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-mgxp-7hhp-8299

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.