Container Toolkit: Container escape to host filesystem via TOCTOU in the **default** configuration
Impact
Container escape to host filesystem via TOCTOU in the **default** configuration
Who can reach it
Any tenant that can run an arbitrary container image on a GPU node
What to do
Bump nvidia-container-toolkit to 1.16.2+ and restart the container runtime on every GPU node; upgrade GPU Operator to 24.6.2+; evict and re-admit tenant workloads
Fleet impact
How widespread
Universal - all versions <= 1.16.1, i.e. the entire installed base at disclosure
Cost to remediate
daemon-restart to 1.16.2 / GPU Operator 24.6.2; hosts that ran untrusted images need node-drain + rebuild because the host-filesystem write has already happened
Why it hits the whole fleet
TOCTOU in the mount path lets a crafted container image mount the host filesystem and execute code as root - the canonical "one CVE, every GPU node in the fleet" event
References
Related entries
- Container Toolkit: Container escape to host root via malicious image (LD_PRELOAD in OCI hook)CVE-2025-23266 · Container ToolkitCritical
- Container Toolkit: Container escape / host file write via symlink followingCVE-2025-23267 · Container ToolkitHigh
- Container Toolkit: Container escape to host root via TOCTOU raceCVE-2026-24260 · Container ToolkitHigh
- Container Toolkit: Container escape to host filesystem (bypass of the CVE-2024-0132 fix)CVE-2025-23359 · Container ToolkitHigh
- Container Toolkit: Unauthorized empty-file creation on the hostCVE-2024-0133 · Container ToolkitMedium
- BlueField (GA firmware): out-of-bounds write in the VF command interface allows code execution on the DPUCVE-2025-23350 · BlueField (GA firmware)Critical
This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.