NVIDIA vGPU software - guest driver (inside tenant VM): A D-Bus configuration file shipped with the Linux vGPU guest
Impact
A D-Bus configuration file shipped with the Linux vGPU guest driver leaves protected endpoints reachable, so an unauthorised user inside the guest VM reaches code execution and privilege escalation within that VM. Scope is confined to the guest VM, so this is a tenant-internal privilege problem rather than a break of your isolation boundary - but it is the first half of a chain if a vGPU Manager bug is also unpatched.
Who can reach it
An unprivileged user inside a guest VM that has a vGPU attached. You may not control these VMs at all if tenants bring their own images.
What to do
Ship the fixed guest driver (bulletin 5415) to tenant VMs. Cost: low on your side, but you often cannot force it - if tenants own their guest images, the realistic control is a supported-driver-version policy plus refusing host attach below a floor version. No host drain required.
References
This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.