NVIDIA GPU Display Driver - Windows kernel mode layer (nvlddmkm.sys): Any local user can null-pointer-dereference

CVSS 7.1CVE-2022-31613NVIDIA / GPU stackcurated

Impact

Any local user can null-pointer-dereference the kernel mode layer and panic the node - no privileges required at all. Only matters to you if you run Windows GPU nodes - VDI/DaaS session hosts, cloud-gaming fleets, Windows render or CAE farms.

Who can reach it

Local and unprivileged on a Windows GPU node, through the driver's private IOCTL / DxgkDdiEscape path. Any interactive or RDP/Citrix session with a GPU handle can call it, so on a multi-session VDI host every logged-in user is in range.

What to do

Install the fixed Windows display driver from bulletin 5383. Cost: a Windows display-driver replacement reboots the node, so drain sessions first. Linux-only fleets can skip this entirely.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31613 https://github.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2022/5383

Related entries

All NVIDIA / GPU stack entries

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.