Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration
containerd: Crafted image config allows arbitrary host file read by containers launched via the CRI plugin
Impact
Crafted image config allows arbitrary host file read by containers launched via the CRI plugin
Who can reach it
Malicious image
What to do
Rolling containerd upgrade with node drain
Fleet impact
How widespread
Universal - containerd is the runtime under nearly every Kubernetes-based GPU cloud; affects <1.6.1 / 1.5.10 / 1.4.12
Cost to remediate
daemon-restart - containerd upgrade; with --restart semantics containers may survive, but the fleet-wide rollout still means touching every node
Why it hits the whole fleet
A specially crafted *image config* - i.e. something a customer supplies - mounts read-only copies of arbitrary host files into the container, bypassing Pod Security Policy; any tenant who can push an image reads host secrets on every node they land on
References
This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.