ntpd (protocol engine, zero-origin timestamp): Continually sending packets with a zero-origin timestamp lets a remote

Impact

Continually sending packets with a zero-origin timestamp lets a remote attacker disrupt an ntpd peer association. Cheap, stateless, and it needs nothing but the ability to send UDP to port 123 — which is open on far more cluster nodes than operators realise, because NTP is usually configured once at image-build time and never reviewed.

Who can reach it

Remote, unauthenticated — UDP packets to the NTP port.

What to do

Upgrade ntp to 4.2.8p11 or later and restart. Also firewall UDP/123 so only your internal time servers can reach cluster nodes — a host or fabric ACL change, applied live, that removes most of the NTP attack surface at once.

References

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