Intel processors (bounds check bypass): Spectre v1: speculative execution past a bounds check lets an attacker read

Impact

Spectre v1: speculative execution past a bounds check lets an attacker read memory the check was supposed to protect, within the same address space. The practical exposure on an AI node is inside anything that JITs or interprets untrusted input - eBPF, a Python runtime, a model-serving framework's custom-op path.

Who can reach it

Local code execution, including code inside a sandbox or interpreter that is meant to be confined.

What to do

Software mitigation in the kernel and in individual programs (array index masking, speculation barriers) rather than microcode. Take kernel updates, keep runtimes current, and assume any interpreter you expose to untrusted input needs its own hardening. Reboot for the kernel component.

References

Related entries

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• Intel processors (L1 terminal fault, OS/SMM): The OS-level variant of L1 terminal fault: a local user can speculativelyCVE-2018-3620 · Intel processors (L1 terminal fault, OS/SMM)Medium
• Intel processors (rogue system register read): Spectre v3a: speculative reads of system registers leak systemCVE-2018-3640 · Intel processors (rogue system register read)Medium
• Intel processors (lazy FP state restore): LazyFP: when the OS restores FPU/vector state lazily, one process canCVE-2018-3665 · Intel processors (lazy FP state restore)Medium
• Intel processors (bounds check bypass store): Spectre 1.1: speculative stores can overflow a bounds-checked bufferCVE-2018-3693 · Intel processors (bounds check bypass store)Medium